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ABSTRACT
Academics’ career trajectories follow diverse paths, and
understanding them is challenging. Animal metaphors, notably
the contrast between hedgehogs and foxes, have helped to
distinguish patterns but need reappraisal as universities change.
Reflecting on prominent sociologists’ careers, the argument is
developed that academic trajectories differ according to whether
work is blue skies or applied, and how it relates to innovation
and consolidation. Four types of academic animals are identified:
bears, beavers, jackdaws and eagles. Ann Oakley’s career is used
to illustrate how individuals’ trajectories may move between
these. For researchers anticipating how their academic futures
may unfold, role models framed in these terms offer alternative
scenarios.
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Introduction
Academics’ research careers take many paths. These trajectories interest early career
researchers planning their futures, established figures pondering their intellectual jour-
neys, biographers analysing the lives of others, and organisational sociologists research-
ing career patterns. Reflecting academics’ penchant for animal metaphors (Sword, 2017,
ch.12), Isaiah Berlin influenced these debates through his discussion of hedgehogs and
foxes as types of ‘intellectual and artistic personality’ (1953, p. 2). Berlin contrasted
those thinkers ‘who relate everything to a single central vision’ and those ‘who pursue
many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory’; these types of thinking are, respect-
ively, ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ (1953, p. 1). Archilocus’s observation, ‘The fox knows
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’, is a line from classical poetry
that Berlin knew was open to interpretation, like other elements of fables and folklore
going back through the Renaissance to ancient Greece (Gould 2004, Preface) and trace-
able additionally to other cultures, such as that of enslaved African-Americans which
bequeathed the classic underdog story of Brer Rabbit (Gladwell, 2014, ch.6). Berlin’s
initial suggestion that hedgehogs and foxes are separated by ‘a great chasm’ was
promptly modified by a concern regarding ‘rigid’ or ‘over-simple’ classifications and by
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his recognition that individuals may be in the hedgehog category ‘in varying degrees’
(1953, p. 1, 2). Berlin struggled with Tolstoy as a difficult case, an individual located ‘by
nature’ among the ‘sharp-eyed foxes’ but nevertheless attracted to a ‘single great
vision’ (1953, p. 80). By positing that Tolstoy’s career trajectory took him away from the
foxes and towards the hedgehogs, Berlin suggested the possibility of the typology
being re-worked.
Berlin’s essay prompted enduring debate, his later remark that it had not been
intended to be taken particularly seriously (Berlin & Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 188) notwith-
standing. Subsequent discussion celebrates hedgehogs’ willingness to work with one
overarching idea in pursuit of an analysis of ever-greater rigour and reach. This is
treated as the reward for thinkers prepared to persevere with a project that requires
extensive commitment (sometimes a whole career) to think through satisfactorily. By
taking their time, hedgehogs are able to build coherent analyses that in a way that
foxes are too impatient, undisciplined or vulnerable to distraction to achieve. By contrast,
there is appreciation for foxes’ nimbleness and their preparedness to change their minds
and to adapt, to pursue new agendas. These things are compared favourably with hedge-
hogs’ stubborn adherence to their one big idea. Konrad Gesner’s sixteenth-century wood-
block portrayals of foxes and hedgehogs are evocative of their respective characteristics,
‘cunning and persistence’ (Gould 2004, p. 2). Philip Tetlock criticises ‘intellectually aggres-
sive’ (2005, p. 20) hedgehogs for their reluctance to admit to error even when examin-
ation of their analyses reveals their flaws. Berlin himself was more sympathetic to foxes
than to hedgehogs; he was a pluralist drawn to unconventional thinkers who were reluc-
tant to ‘swim with the tide’ (1953, p. 81) of prevailing opinion Figures 1 and 2.
Berlin portrayed Karl Marx as a hedgehog whose career was devoted to elaborating a
core idea that by his early thirties was fixed; after this, Marx ‘was emotionally and intellec-
tually set and hardly changed at all’ (1982, p. 13). Marx proceeded, according to Berlin, to
construct ‘a complete theory of society and its evolution’, an analytical framework
Figure 1. Konrad Gesner’s fox https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/historicalanatomies/gesner_
home.html p. 1081.
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developed as ‘a single systematic whole’, a ‘single integrated account’ (1982, pp. 9, 10, 15).
The defensive spines of the hedgehog are conjured up by Berlin’s description of Marx’s
thinking: ‘The system as it finally emerged was a massive structure, not to be taken by
direct assault’ (1982, p. 12). Another hedgehog figure was Auguste Comte, whose
pursuit of what Berlin described as ‘one complete and all-embracing pyramid of scientific
knowledge’ through the application of ‘one method’ betrayed a ‘naïve craving for unity
and symmetry at the expense of experience’ (2008, p. 96). Other hedgehogs in the socio-
logical canon include Herbert Spencer (with his distinctly nineteenth-century overarching
idea of social evolution), Talcott Parsons (dedicated to exploration of social systems), and
Norbert Elias (who engaged over more than six decades with the civilising process). Less
straightforwardly, Elias’s contemporary Barbara Wootton’s writings had gender inequality
as a recurrent concern without it being systematically ‘subjected to her critical analytical
gaze’ (Oakley, 2011, p. 351). Likewise, T. H. Marshall’s work on citizenship suggests another
hedgehog characteristic, having a novel and important idea and developing it ‘into a
coherent theory’ (Mann, 1996, p. 125), but however influential it was, it did not structure
his whole career.
Robert Merton has been identified as a fox on the grounds of his awareness of ambiva-
lence, his preference for middle range theorising, and his ‘roving mind’ (Bierstedt, 1990,
p. 67) that led him to serendipitous findings, and to the concept of serendipity itself
(Merton & Barber, 2006). Erving Goffman with his ‘brilliant but butterfly mind’ (Giddens,
1988, p. 251) is another sociological fox. His career had a centrifugal pattern as he
switched between metaphors of social life as drama, games, strategy and ritual. Critical
of approaches that created frameworks ‘into which a continuously larger number of
facts can be placed’ (1971, p. 21), Goffman remarked that ‘scaffolds… . should be
erected with an eye to taking them down’ (1969, p. 246). Another fox was Michael
Young, whose restless nature meant that he was always cultivating new projects but
not necessarily building on them; Peter Townsend described him as having a ‘talent for
innovation without necessarily consolidation’ (Mullan, 1996, p. 238). He had multitudi-
nous interests (Dench, Flower, & Gavron, 1995) but sooner or later ‘he tended to lose inter-
est in things’ (Sennett, 2006, p. iv). His remark that ‘to be any good as a researcher, you
have to be prepared to change your mind’ (quoted in Briggs, 2001, p. x) was also
Figure 2. Konrad Gesner’s hedgehog https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/historicalanatomies/
gesner_home.html p. 400.
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vulpine. A fellow fox in this regard was Ray Pahl, who periodically returned to his ideas in
order ‘to modify them substantially’ (1984, p. 13), in contrast to hedgehogs’ efforts to
shore up their systems when they come under strain. Pahl also followed a vulpine
agenda across the panoply of sociological activities set out by Garry Runciman (1997,
p. xiv). Runciman understood the seven types of sociological work that he identified to
constitute options from which an individual might focus on one or some, but Pahl’s socio-
logical nose led him in all directions during a long and varied career (Crow & Takeda,
2011). Denied the opportunity to hold formal university positions, many of Lynn McDo-
nald’s (1994) women founders of the social sciences had similarly eclectic interests.
Their inclusion in debates about academic animal types is belatedly being facilitated as
inherited gender biases in the writing of the history of social science and the biographies
of social scientists are rectified.
Reconsidering the hedgehog/fox distinction
Identifying people who conform to the defining characteristics of hedgehogs or foxes has
some utility, but it takes things only so far. To begin with, it does not differentiate later
career trajectories. Among sociologists who have lived beyond 80 there are instances
of both hedgehogs and foxes continuing to work right up to the end of their lives.
Examples include Elias and Spencer on one side and Merton and Young on the other.
A hedgehog’s pursuit of further confirmations of their theory and rebuttals of criticisms
may be just as compelling a reason to keep working as a fox’s pursuit of further eye-catch-
ing new things. Neither is it possible to discern a distinct pattern between hedgehogs and
foxes who died younger. Examples exist of both leaving uncompleted agendas. Among
the hedgehogs, Marx’s death at 64 came with only the first volume of Capital published;
his collaborator Frederick Engels had to work on the other two before their posthumous
publication. More than a century on, Ernest Gellner was still actively jousting with contem-
poraries, including Berlin, at the time of his death aged 69. His biographer insists on
placing Gellner’s ‘highly integrated mind’ (Hall, 2011, p. x) in the hedgehog camp.
Among the foxes, Goffman’s death aged 60 left ‘unfinished business’ (Williams, 2008,
p. 194). Pahl, who died aged 75, also remained academically active to the last. Academics
may resemble politicians, haunted by the idea of a career ending in failure. Christopher
Husbands (2019, p. 391ff) considers this hypothesis in relation to LSE sociologists,
mindful perhaps of Crane Brinton’s question concerning academic obsolescence, ‘Who
now reads Spencer?’ (Parsons, 1968, p. 3).
Further difficulties make it hard to sustain a clear-cut distinction between hedgehogs
and foxes. Berlin himself grappled with the case of Tolstoy, describing him as ‘a fox, who
wanted to be a hedgehog’ (Berlin & Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 190). Marshall, another tricky
case, would not himself have recognised the identification by later scholars of citizenship
as his one big idea; only one of the chapters in Sociology at the Crossroads (Marshall, 1963)
addressed citizenship, and he identified social stratification as his principal subject. His
inaugural lecture criticised ‘over-elaboration of concepts’, but he distanced himself not
only from ‘wide generalizations’ but also from the opposing view that ‘small facts are
worth more than big because it takes finer tackle to catch them’ (Marshall, 1963, p. 14,
12, 15). Despite the fact that ‘Marshall is remembered above all for the brilliance of his
work on citizenship’ (Giddens, 1996, p. 208), he is not easy to place in either camp,
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hedgehog or fox. In the case of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (who herself had an
interest in anthropomorphism and wrote about animal metaphors), her biographer
Richard Fardon considered Lewis Coser’s treatment of her as ‘very much a fox’ a view
that was both ‘right and wrong’ (1999, p. 243). Fardon noted his subject’s ‘extravagant
range’ of interests, but nevertheless argued that ‘like the hedgehog, Douglas has
known one big thing’; her various works constitute ‘the organic outgrowth of the way
in which she has explored her big idea’ (1999, p. 243). Her core analytical frame of grid
and group was established before she was 50, and was followed by several decades of
‘excursions and adventures’ (1999, p. vii) elaborating on it.
Howard Becker recommends that when classifying we pay attention to ‘cases that
don’t fit’ (1998, p. 85). One response to awkward cases is to rework a simple opposition
as a continuum. In Tetlock’s hands (in his study of political prediction) this moves from
hedgehogs through hedge-foxes and fox-hogs to foxes. It is a ‘rough cognitive-style con-
tinuum’ with the intermediate positions located between the extremes of ‘closed-mind-
edness’ and ‘excessive open-mindedness’ (2005, p. 20, 23). Foxes are saved from
hedgehogs’ vulnerability to ‘excessive enthusiasm’, ‘overconfidence’ and even ‘hubris’
by their ‘self-critical, point-counterpoint style of thinking’ (2005, pp. 21–2). Against this,
the tentative, qualified manner with which they ‘hedged their bets’ gave foxes’ predic-
tions less appeal to audiences than the ‘confident, decisive modes of thinking favoured
by hedgehogs’ (2005, p. 21). In this competition for attention, hedgehogs are aided by
people’s dislike of ‘ambiguity’, which makes them more open to persuasion by analyses
that are presented with boldness and confidence and that promise closure and less per-
suaded by analyses produced by foxes who are ‘eclectic’ and ‘content to improvise ad hoc
solutions’ (2005, p. 38, 82, 21) to problems. Tetlock describes hedgehogs as ‘thinkers who
“know one big thing,” aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing
into new domains, [and] display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it”’
(2005, p. 73). In contrast, foxes are ‘thinkers who know many small things… are sceptical
of grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as
exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse sources of infor-
mation, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prowess’ (2005, pp. 73–5).
Between these ends of the continuum Tetlock located a quarter of his participating
experts as hedge-foxes and another quarter as fox-hogs, based on their responses to
his ‘Styles-of Reasoning Questionnaire’ (2005, p. 241; see also p. 72ff). Tetlock’s intermedi-
ate positions offer greater subtlety than the stark hedgehog/fox choice.
Becker’s advice also encourages examination of instances in which an individual
thinker does not occupy one, fixed position but rather shifts over time. The industrial soci-
ologist Alan Fox, whose period as an Oxford don overlapped with Berlin’s, described his
early ‘struggle to think out a social and political philosophy which held together in some
kind of – always provisional – integration, both my personal values and ideas’ (1990,
p. 215). The ‘itch for a theoretical framework’ was not easily satisfied, and he found the
process of ‘groping towards a theoretical structure’ a prolonged one; only latterly did
he feel his ideas had reached ‘some kind of satisfactory unity’ (1990, p. 224, 231, 234).
It was, as his autobiography’s title has it, ‘a very late development’, and not only
because he entered academia as a mature student. He described the experience of chan-
ging his analytical perspective as a long and painful process, ‘among the more punishing
aspects of the academic life’ (1990, p. 236). This involved overcoming doubts about
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theorising being ‘mere self-indulgence’ (1974, p. 368). His movement towards the hedge-
hogs was only ever partial, but his final academic book was nevertheless the result of that
direction of travel; it was an ‘effort at synthesis’ (1985, p. xii) that sought to bring together
in a coherent framework the varied material on which he had worked across his career.
Fox’s ‘intellectual pilgrimage’ took him to a greater appreciation of ‘the value of concep-
tual thought, abstract speculation, and imaginative perception’ (1990, p. 225, 245). It also
left him positive about formally retiring at 60 after three decades in academia.
A further limitation of the hedgehog/fox distinction is its normative framing. The short-
comings of hedgehogs – their rigidity, overconfidence, and tendency to gravitate towards
confirmatory evidence – are treated as more serious than those of foxes, who are comfor-
table with analytical flexibility, ambiguity, and caution. This assessment might be coun-
tered by Basil Bernstein’s remark that ‘An ad hoc a day may keep a theory in play but
in the end destroys it, because it prevents any rethinking of the basic structure’ (1973,
p. 18). Bernstein developed his theory of restricted and elaborated codes of speech
through publications that contained ‘much inconsistency’, about which he was unapolo-
getic because they stood as ‘a sign of growth’ on the journey towards a more defensible
grasp of the subject under investigation through on-going ‘conceptual development’
(1973, p. 18, 29). Berlin observed that, in general, hedgehogs with their pursuit of analyti-
cal rigour are driven to an unusual extent. It is foxes with their more relaxed attitude to
inconsistency that are more often encountered: people ‘obsessed by single models are
rare’ (1980, p. 159). Berlin conceded that people could be seduced by ‘a unitary pattern
in which the whole of experience… . is systematically ordered’ (2008, p. 155) but
warned of such models being ‘blown up by reality’ (1980, p. 159). Berlin arrived at his con-
clusions more through philosophical analysis than through engagement with sociology, a
discipline he disparaged (Runciman, 2004, p. 220). Given its primary focus in Berlin’s hands
on individual personalities rather than on the contexts in which people pursued their
intellectual work, the hedgehog/fox distinction might usefully be re-configured in a
more sociological fashion.
Blue skies and impact, innovation and consolidation
Animal imagery features regularly in the history of social analysis. Francis Bacon’s seven-
teenth-century identification of scientists as ants, spiders or bees highlights the varying
significance attached to data collection and theorising in a way that has enduing rel-
evance (Hollis, 1994, ch.4). A century later Bernard de Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees
presented society as a more sophisticated entity than ‘a Herd of Cows or a Flock of
Sheep’ (1970, p. 350), with greater scope for the pursuit of individual interest which in
turn generates unintended consequences at the level of society. Later thinkers to
engage with this idea include Adam Smith and Karl Marx (Dumont, 1977). Marx’s view
of ‘the bee, the beaver, the ant, etc.’ (1975, p. 329) as more instinctive than humans
was in turn challenged by Vilfredo Pareto’s emphasis on ‘sentiments’, the ‘natural’, ‘non-
logical’ bases of human action which led him to distinguish between two types of elite
groups, lions and foxes (Zeitlin, 1987, ch.12). These animal metaphors were re-worked
by John Scott who built on Pareto’s idea that lions employ coercion and foxes inducement
to secure their power; Scott adds bears and owls, which operate through authority rather
than constraint. The bear’s ‘domineering but benign’ command is accepted as ‘right,
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correct, justified or valid in some way’, while the owl’s position is attributable to accep-
tance of the ‘expertise… . characteristic of the wise “owls”’ (2001, p. 20, 23). Separately,
Gerald Mars’s (1983, p. 29) classification of types of people engaged in workplace crime
employs Douglas’s (1978, ch.4) concepts of grid and group to identify wolves, vultures,
hawks and donkeys; these are placed in the quadrants of a two-by-two matrix according
to how strongly cultural categories are imposed on members of the group and the
strength of collective orientation among members of the group. Such an approach has
the advantages over the simple hedgehog/fox contrast of having two dimensions,
thereby facilitating a focus on social context as well as individual predispositions.
When studying career trajectories, deep methodological divisions exist about how best
to research them (Abbott, 2001, ch.5). Whichever approach is adopted requires paying
attention to the evolving contexts within which careers are forged and the forces
shaping what type of academic any one individual aspires to become and is able to
become. Among contemporary characterisations of universities there is broad agreement
that recent decades have seen not only expansion but also intensified competition,
extended bureaucratic regulation, and growing concern to apply knowledge and
thereby to demonstrate research ‘impact’. In some accounts these processes are
framed as involving corresponding moves away from collegiality, trust, and ‘basic
research’ or ‘blue skies thinking’ justified on its own terms, what Thorstein Veblen
called (with characteristic irony) ‘idle curiosity’ (Diggins, 1978, p. 181). These trends
offer an analytical basis for understanding the changing nature of academic careers,
although constructing a robust typology faces challenges specifying how they exert
influence over career trajectories. Where impact is sought, for example, intended out-
comes do not necessarily arrive at the desired time (and may not arrive at all). Conversely,
blue skies research can have practical applications that exemplify Merton’s (1936) notion
of ‘unanticipated consequences’.
A century on from Veblen’s analysis of challenges to the pursuit of unimpeded aca-
demic inquiry it has been argued that ‘the public funding of science is increasingly
directed away from “blue skies” research toward research that can show a direct
benefit to a private beneficiary’ (Holmwood, 2011, p. 4). According to Philip Moriarty, pur-
suing research is in tension with ‘the disinterestedness of scientists in attacking a research
problem’ (2011, p. 57). From this point of view, ‘Scientists involved in fundamental
research are traditionally driven by curiosity’ and if their original question leads them
to ‘discover serendipitously a more interesting avenue of research then they should be
free to “follow their nose” and explore because no one knows where that particular
line of enquiry might lead’ (2011, p. 60). The argument that ‘collaborative research with
a non-academic partner… . necessarily means a narrowing of research aims and
objectives’ (Bailey, 2011, p. 97) is, naturally, contested by advocates of the impact
agenda on the grounds that much applied research would be unfeasible without
collaboration beyond academia, and in addition less ethical, and less able to effect
change in the world. This debate is not new. Already by the 1990s people engaged in
applied research constituted a significant proportion of the university workforce
(Halsey, 1995, p. 4) and renewed cases for ‘an active sociology’ (Payne & Cross, 1993)
were being promoted. Throughout the history of the discipline many figures have advo-
cated similar agendas; Jane Addams (McDonald, 1994, pp. 228–33; Oakley, 2018, ch.3) and
Patrick Geddes (Mairet, 1957, Pt.2) are prominent examples. Sociologists have debated
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the blue skies/applied issue since the discipline’s institutional establishment in the
nineteenth century; this warrants its adoption as one dimension of a typology of career
patterns.
Specifying the typology’s other dimension is more tricky. It is not straightforwardly
competition versus collegiality. Competition quite readily co-exists with collegiality, as
Fox’s description of his college as a ‘highly competitive place’ (1990, p. 219) attests.
The literature on contemporary universities identifies ‘hyper-competitiveness’ (Water-
meyer, 2019, p. 17) as integral to the world of targets, algorithms and league tables
within which academic careers are now forged. The roots of the marketized system
known as ‘academic capitalism’ have been traced back to the 1980s (Slaughter & Leslie,
1997, p. 1), but competition has been a feature of universities for much longer. Pierre
Bourdieu’s data supporting his analysis of the competitive, game-like character of aca-
demic careers come from an earlier period, suggesting that the acquisition of academic
capital is inherently competitive. Bourdieu also noted that career-building requires
newly-arrived competitors to seek sponsorship or patronage from more established
figures, such as the thesis supervisor in Germany known as ‘the Doktorvater, the
“doctor’s father”’ (1988, p. 88). Barrie Thorne and Arlie Hochschild’s (1997) likening of aca-
demic departments to patriarchal families, characterised by sibling rivalry for the head of
department father figure’s favour, echoes this theme. Hochschild elsewhere treats com-
petition as a feature of how academic advancement is routinely gendered; replacing
the standard ‘clockwork of male careers’ would require shifting ‘the balance between
competition and co-operation’ (2003, p. 252). This would be more consistent with a
caring ethos and collegiality, although the problematic phenomenon of being ‘overly
concerned with the needs of others’ (Hochschild, 1983, p. 195, emphasis in original) is
another danger, also gendered.
Competition is an important element in Mars’s typology of people engaged in work-
place crime, notably in the profile of those he calls hawks, a group with which he had par-
ticular familiarity (2015, p. x). For hawks, both grid and group constraints are weak; their
resultant autonomy gave them the opportunity to be entrepreneurial, and no reason to
collaborate or to have relations of mutuality or reciprocity with fellow workers. Mars
includes ‘successful academics’ (1983, p. 29) among them. His commentary on hawks is
instructive: ‘Since competition is a dominant characteristic of this type, and because
the group dimension is weak, we find that alliances among hawks tend to shift with expe-
diency and that a climate of suspicion is more common than one of trust’ (1983, p. 29). For
‘the cosmopolitan academic with prestige, extensive contacts and his own consultancies’
(1983, p. 64), academic autonomy is facilitative of fiddles around expenses and accounting
for time use. Academics who develop fiddles may be tolerated by some (possibly envious)
colleagues, although others will frown upon them and emphasise instead the mutuality,
reciprocity and obligations to others that are in Mars’s schema in tension with compe-
tition. Merton’s famous specification of ‘communism, universalism, disinterestedness
and organized scepticism’ as the foundations of ‘the ethos of modern science’ (1942,
p. 118) is relevant here because it suggests treating hawks as rule breakers who disregard
the convention of adhering to the norms by which the enhancement of the collective
endeavour is prioritised. In his analysis of deviance, Merton (1956) described expedient
behaviour that involves resorting to unconventional and disruptive means as ‘innovation’
(in contrast to ‘conformity’).
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Innovators can secure a competitive edge in many fields. In academia, innovation has
become prized as a route to individual career advancement and collective intellectual
progress, and in sociology the pursuit of ‘Kuhnian revolutions’ has been prominent
since the 1960s (Friedrichs, 1972). The discipline has seen numerous paradigm-shifting
‘turns’, innovations which discourage operating within established approaches, the short-
comings of which they emphasise. Andre Gunder Frank’s damning characterisation of
modernisation theory as ‘empirically invalid, theoretically inadequate and politically
ineffective’ (Harrison, 1988, p. 78) exemplifies such wholesale critique. Another illustration
of the power of new ideas to reshape knowledge is feminism’s distinction between ‘sex’
and ‘gender’. Ann Oakley developed this in her first book Sex, Gender and Society, arguing
that ‘the whole conceptual territory was a mess’ (Oakley, 2015a, p. 3). In related publi-
cations Oakley argued for a fresh start in sociology from a feminist perspective because
existing approaches were sexist, leaving women ‘invisible’ (2019b, ch.1). Oakley’s career
has seen further advocacy of innovation, making the case for randomised controlled
trials to be included in sociologists’ methodological toolkit (Oakley, 2019a), and experi-
menting with modes of presentation, for example autobiography. Her account of her
relationship with her father, the social policy academic Richard Titmuss, was a deliberate
‘refusal to fit stereotyped notions of what books ought to be’ (Oakley, 2014, p. xi). Oakley
thus appears a convention-breaking innovator, but her career comprises more than pio-
neering innovations, and her critique of post-modernism as a ‘delusional system’ (Oakley,
2002, ch.8) disavows disruption for disruption’s sake. For the purpose of classifying aca-
demic career trajectories, we might draw on Merton’s contrast between innovation and
conformity and re-name the latter ‘consolidation’, or the realm of normal science in
which knowledge is painstakingly built up incrementally within a framework that evalu-
ates findings systematically according to agreed criteria. Within this framing, Oakley’s
work moves between innovation and consolidation.
A case study, and some further animals
Oakley’s description of systematic reviewing as ‘another giant leap for sociology’ followed
her involvement in reviewing quantitative and qualitative outputs from numerous
researchers in the fields of health, education and welfare in order to support evidence-
based policy and ‘practical feminism’ (2005, p. 209, 51). Her innovative thinking about
gender in Sex, Gender and Society nevertheless relied heavily on many other people’s
work, notably that of ‘American psychiatrists… and anthropological work on the position
of men and women in non-Western cultures’ (2005, p. 2). Drawing on diverse researchers’
findings also features in Fracture (Oakley, 2007), her account of a personal injury interwo-
ven with information about ageing human bodies gleaned from several disciplines. These
publications all involve, in their different ways, ‘experiments in knowing’ (Oakley, 2000).
Table 1. A typology of research styles, using Ann Oakley’s works as exemplars
Consolidation Innovation
Blue skies research Fracture (2007) The Sociology of Housework (1974/2019b)
Applied research ‘Sexual health interventions for young people’
(1995)
Social Support and Motherhood (1992/
2019a)
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 9
Mapping her work in a typology of academic endeavour that contrasts blue skies/applied
research and innovation/consolidation, she can be found in all four quadrants of Table 1.
This classification has similarities with but is not identical to Douglas’s (1996, p. 43) typol-
ogy of cultures and her (1978, p. 84) representation of grid and group, and Mars’s (1983,
p. 29) typology of workplace criminals. The published version of Oakley’s PhD on house-
work is heavily-cited, yet the research was treated dismissively at the proposal stage: ‘How
could housework possibly be a serious academic subject?’ (2019b, p. vii). It is classified
here as innovative and blue skies. Also innovative (within sociology at least), by virtue
of using randomised controlled trials, Social Support and Motherhood is treated as
applied research because of the project’s explicit concern to improve maternity services.
An example of applied work that consolidates and builds on the work of others is Oakley
and colleagues’ review of sexual health interventions (Oakley et al., 1995), while Fracture’s
combination of her ‘personal story with those of others, and with history, anthropology,
neurology, and the sociology of the body, health and illness’ (2007, p. v) populates the
blue skies/consolidation quadrant.
This exercise is merely a starting point. Oakley’s curriculum vitae shows these four pub-
lications to be less than 1% of her published work (see https://www.annoakley.co.uk/
cv2018.pdf) and placing even 10% into the table would reveal a much messier picture
than the apparently neat clockwise movement from the top right quadrant represented
here. This point is consistent with Oakley being ‘sceptical about having had a “career”’ in
the sense of ‘a progression from a lower point to some kind of “advanced” status’ (2015b,
p. 112). There is, in her view, at best a ‘serendipitous logic of a researcher’s career, a logic
which often becomes available only with the benefit of hindsight’ (2019a, p. viii). Merton
described serendipity in social research as chance discoveries by those who knew how to
look for them (Sztompka, 1986, p. 98), and unplanned facilitation of careers is well-docu-
mented. In her research among Brazilian anthropologists Mariza Peirano was ‘surprised to
hear, again and again, the expression “It was by chance”… . offered as an explanation of a
change of course at a specific moment of their careers’ (qtd in Becker, 1998, p. 30). Leon
Grunberg’s (2007) ‘serendipitous career’ included the unexpected opportunity for a
natural experiment which confirmed Merton’s (1956) observations about their stimulation
of theoretical developments. Reporting Wootton’s view about her professional life being
one in which ‘serendipity had played a much larger part in its direction than had informed
choice’ (Oakley, 2015a, p. 110), Oakley finds resonance with her own trajectory. This also
echoes those participants in Jennifer Platt’s study of the earlier generation of British soci-
ologists who ‘described their own careers as haphazard and unplanned’, having found
themselves in a context in which there was ‘little scope for career planning’ (1976,
p. 157, 158) because opportunities arose largely by luck.
These observations are important correctives against the temptation retrospectively to
impose order onto careers that have developed less strategically than organically, or poss-
ibly haphazardly (Platt, 1976, p. 125). Gary Marx has described his academic career as
involving both ‘opportunities to pursue topics of one’s own choosing’ and (quoting
Herman Melville) being ‘pulled hither and thither by circumstances’ (2017, p. 124, 119).
Bourdieu’s endorsement of the idea that ‘scientists are akin to pirates, taking advantage
of opportunities as they arise’ (1996, p. 232), provides a vivid image to this effect. The
forces at work on individuals’ careers beyond their control include the vagaries of how
grant-awarding bodies arrive at evaluations of academic merit (Lamont, 2010). Stephen
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Turner has angrily implied that it was no coincidence that ‘Merton wrote about the
Matthew effect, in which those who are given advantages, get much greater advantages’
(2005, p. 300). Turner’s contrary experience of being pushed to the margins of the socio-
logical establishment is illustrative of the ‘tribal’ and ‘territorial’ nature of academic life
(Becher & Trowler, 2001) and also resonates with Berlin’s ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’
(1953, p. 1) forces. This prompts thinking of innovators as people propelled to the
margins, preferring to keep separate and rejecting work that has gone before as sterile,
and consolidators as located in a more pluralist mainstream, more aggregative in their
ambitions. It also suggests thinking of applied researchers as more practical or more
‘grounded’ than their airborne ‘blue skies’ counterparts.
Identifying animals to populate the quadrants of the typology, the dams and lodges of
beavers and the dens of bears establish their credentials as grounded builders, but they
are distinguished by the bears’ more solitary lifestyle, compared to that of the group-
oriented beavers. Among the airborne occupants of the typology set out Table 2, jack-
daws are likewise more collective in their habits than the less sociable but predatory
eagles. Jackdaws’ penchant for collecting is relevant too; collecting matters to consolida-
tors because the accumulation of materials facilitates the systemisation of knowledge in a
field, sometimes serendipitously (Merton and Barber 2006, pp. 224–5). As an alternative to
Berlin’s hedgehogs and foxes, such a typology is both less normative (in that each of the
types is credited with a positive role) and more readily operationalisable empirically, if it is
accepted that the types relate to particular phases rather than a whole lifetime’s work. A
career may see an individual working in different quadrants at different times. It may also
give recognition to a greater proportion of researchers by focusing less exclusively on the
heroic model of dazzling careers involving paradigm-shifting innovatory breakthroughs
for which foxes (who do not concentrate on consolidation) and hedgehogs (who concen-
trate on rounding out their initial disruption of previous thinking) hold centre stage. Put
another way, it is more inclusive as a map of careers than the celebration of major shifts
within a discipline and the ‘great men’ (and, more rarely, ‘great women’) identified as insti-
gating them. Becoming an ‘academic superhero’ (Hay, 2017) is not for everyone; other
options are available. It is also important to note that the achievements of ‘the stellar
researcher’ frequently rely on ‘“hired hands” who do much of the research’ (Brannen,
2019, p. 180) Figures 3–6.
Conclusions
The hedgehog/fox contrast offers a stimulating but problematic framing of academic
career trajectories. Individuals who are difficult to classify in these terms indicate that
researchers do not necessarily stay exclusively with one way of working. It also
Table 2. A typology of animal-based researcher identities.
Consolidation (mainstream, generalist;
group-oriented; pluralist)
Innovation (periphery, specialist; solitary;
independent; disruptive)
Blue skies research
(airborne observers)
Jackdaws Eagles
Applied research (ground-
based builders)
Beavers Bears
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exaggerates the extent to which individuals control the direction taken by their careers. In
addition, the understandable focus on leading figures conveys an unrealistically heroic
image of careers by playing down science’s routine character. Research is not all glory
(Weber, 2004, p. 8). Furthermore, present-day arrangements may militate against hedge-
hogs; pressure for quick results makes The Slow Professor (Berg & Seeber, 2016) a belea-
guered figure, however much childhood lessons from Aesop about the tortoise and the
hare point to a different conclusion, one celebrated in the skrivarsekten academic
writers’ group’s motto, ‘The snail conquers all’ (Sword, 2017, p. 199). Hedgehogs are
also out of step with the move away from specialisation which is the direction of travel
being taken in training future generations of scholars (Luker, 2008, p. 9ff). This trend is
driven by critics of the fact that ‘The specialist can go on mining within a very narrow,
intellectually fenced-in area without ever being disturbed by the burning issues of the
day’ (Back, 2016, p. 118). The hubris to which Tetlock found hedgehogs vulnerable also
serves as a cautionary tale against over-claiming the merits of one particular point of
view to the detriment of others. Conversely, other aspects of present-day arrangements
may work against foxes. Their penchant for striking out in new directions makes it
harder to build knowledge. As Colin Bell (1977, p. 60) pointed out, in situations of theor-
etical and methodological flux, when accounts of a phenomenon vary over time it is
Figure 3. Konrad Gesner’s eagle https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/historicalanatomies/gesner_
home.html vol.3 p. 163.
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difficult to determine whether this is due to change in society or in sociology. Bell’s warn-
ings of the dangers of paradigm wars took time to be heeded, and although these
conflicts may now be adjudged ‘a pointless and damaging episode in social research’ (Wil-
liams & Vogt, 2011, p. 4), the risk remains of pugilistic hedgehogs and undisciplined foxes
initiating their return.
In later life, Berlin did not fret over the limitations of his analysis, describing it as ‘not
exhaustive’ because ‘Some people are neither foxes nor hedgehogs, some people are
both’ (Berlin & Jahanbegloo, 1991, p. 189). A typology that can accommodate people’s
shifts over the course of their careers, reflecting the rhythms of academic life, promises
benefits. There are, for example, spirited discussions of when in an academic’s career
their best work is done, and how likely this is to be followed by a ‘mid-life crisis’
Figure 4. Konrad Gesner’s bear https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/historicalanatomies/gesner_
home.html p. 1065.
Figure 5. Konrad Gesner’s beaver https://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/historicalanatomies/gesner_
home.html p. 336.
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(Becher & Trowler, 2001, p. 140ff). These things vary by discipline, and also by gender
(Hochschild, 2003, p. 237). The individual sociologists discussed here are not necessarily
typical of the broader discipline, let alone of other disciplines, but they do point to
lessons that can be learned about careers. Perhaps the most important of these is that
careers rarely follow a set course. Oakley rightly notes that her work history does not
conform to the conventional career pattern; women face particular challenges fitting
into this, as do other historically-marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities (Becher
& Trowler, 2001, p. 153ff). It follows that role models plural are required (Hochschild,
2003, p. 233). These will not apply in all contexts: strategies that worked in the past
may be inappropriate for to-day’s changed circumstances in which early career research-
ers face uncertainties and insecurities at levels not seen for at least a generation. But if
past performance is not necessarily a reliable guide to future success, some career
stories embody enduring significance. One such would be the resilience of Elias whose
achievements came despite exile from Nazi Germany and not securing a university
post until the age of 57 (Elias, 1994).
Researchers who over the course of their working lives have moved between the
identities contained in Table 2 (from bear to beaver, for example, or jackdaw to
beaver and back) provide numerous alternative role models beyond those of hedge-
hog and fox. Oakley’s occupancy of all four quadrants during different periods of
her career makes her unusual, but her story is nevertheless instructive through what
it demonstrates about not having to make once-and-for-all choices between individual
Figure 6. Jackdaws https://pixabay.com/vectors/coat-of-arms-borch-three-jackdaws-2355368/
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scholarship and team working, or between the applied and blue skies realms. It is
telling that she was inspired by Charles Wright Mills’s rejection of the false choice
between ‘grand theory’ and ‘abstracted empiricism’ (Oakley, 2015b, p. 111). Also reveal-
ing is her critical engagement with rather than slavish adherence to or wholesale dis-
missal of the ideas of earlier generations of researchers. Her criticisms of the ‘founding
fathers’ of her discipline are trenchant (Oakley, 2019b, ch.1), but she is equally passio-
nate about recognising the overlooked contributions of their female counterparts
(Oakley, 2018). There are echoes here of Merton’s view that researchers should be
neither overly reverential nor unduly dismissive of the giants on whose shoulders
they find themselves standing (Sztompka, 1986, p. 20ff). In academic life there are
‘many forms of originality’ including both ‘bringing a new perspective’ and ‘drawing
on new sources of information’ (Lamont, 2010, pp. 171–2), and these involve
different types of engagement with forerunners.
Locating oneself in relation to predecessors does not have to be done in ways they
would necessarily have endorsed. The view taken of the advancement of knowledge by
Max Weber was that individual scholars must resign themselves to their achievements
becoming ‘obsolete in ten, twenty, or fifty years’ (2004, p. 11). He also judged academic
life ‘an utter gamble’ (2004, p. 11), and psychologically difficult to bear, even when
approached as a vocation. While it is true that the achievement of advances in knowledge
can be hard to predict and ‘messy’ (Harford, 2016), it remains prudent advice to research-
ers not to be ‘solely reliant on the winds of change to direct your career’ (Woodthorpe,
2018, p. 213). An individual can aspire to be ‘moved… by conscious purposes, which
are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside’ (Berlin, 2008,
p. 178) but periodic reconsideration of what options are feasible will be assisted by
clarity regarding the range of available role models, not least for what they reveal
about structural constraints as well as the component parts out of which successful strat-
egies are forged. This is supported by the alternative translation of Archilocus’s saying as
‘The fox devises many strategies; the hedgehog knows one great and effective strategy’
(Gould 2004, p. 2). Douglas’s opinion that ‘animal differentiations are a splendidly apt
source of metaphors for thinking about human differentiation’ (1996, p. 139) also
encourages this endeavour.
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